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Is China’s innovation boom a miracle or mirage? As a comprehensive national innovation 
development strategy, China’s National Technology Zone (NTZ) pilot provides an excellent natural 
experiment for the analysis of this phenomenon multidimensionally. Using unique Chinese Patent 
Census Database and matching it with Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database, this paper shows that 
the establishment of NTZs has promoted firm innovation, as well as innovation in high-tech industries 
and indigenous innovation, measured by both the quantity and the quality of invention patents. In this 
sense, China is creating an innovation miracle in general. More evidence from our results shows that 
both firm–academia collaboration and FDI inflows play significantly positive roles in China’s 
achievement of this miracle. However, there are also two types of innovation mirages: 1) there is no 
significant impact of NTZs on the quality of patents after the financial crisis of 2008, which might be 
attributed to the relatively radical macro planning; 2) the establishment of NTZs has brought 
enhancement of patent quality for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but not for non-SOEs, which might 
be ascribed to the imperfect market institution. Finally, we provide some policy suggestions on the 
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China’s Innovation Boom: Miracle or Mirage? 
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Abstract (longer version): Over the past few decades, the Chinese government has adopted a series 
of national innovation development strategies, which have begotten the rapid growth of Chinese 
patenting. However, the views expressed by the international community regarding this patent boom 
are split right down the middle, with some seeing it as an innovation miracle and others dismissing it 
as an innovation mirage. The one-dimensional nature of the existing patent growth hypotheses makes 
it difficult to explain many important aspects of the so-called “China’s innovation boom”. As a 
comprehensive national innovation development strategy, China’s National Technology Zone (NTZ) 
pilot provides an excellent natural experiment for the analysis of this phenomenon multidimensionally. 
Using unique Chinese Patent Census Database and matching it with Chinese Industrial Firm Census 
Database, this paper shows that the establishment of NTZs has promoted firm innovation, as well as 
innovation in high-tech industries and indigenous innovation, measured by both the quantity and the 
quality of invention patents. In this sense, China is creating an innovation miracle in general. More 
evidence from our results shows that both firm–academia collaboration and FDI inflows play 
significantly positive roles in China’s achievement of this miracle. However, there are also two types 
of innovation mirages: 1) there is no significant impact of NTZs on the quality of patents after the 
financial crisis of 2008, which might be attributed to the relatively radical macro planning; 2) the 
establishment of NTZs has brought enhancement of patent quality for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
but not for non-SOEs, which might be ascribed to the imperfect market institution. Finally, we provide 
some policy suggestions on the basis of our analysis. 
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 Since the turn of this century, patents in China have been increasing rapidly. The ratio of invention 
patent applications in China and Patent Cooperation Treaty (hereinafter “PCT”) filings from China to 
the global total increased from 3.79% and 0.84 % in 2000 to 46.36% and 21.11% in 2018, respectively. 
Furthermore, both invention patent applications by residents and PCT applications have been soaring 
since 2009 although there has been little growth for nonresident patents since then (see Figure 1). 
With the boom of patents in China, two distinct positions have emerged. Some (e.g., Keane, 2007; 
Yusuf, 2012; Campbell, 2013; Beinhart, 2018; Atkinson and Foote, 2019) assert that China is creating 
an innovation miracle with the help of the national innovation development strategy and is 
experiencing an innovation catch-up with advanced economies. Others (e.g., Prud’homme, 2012; 
Waldmeir, 2013; The Economist, 2014; Chen, 2018) call into question the quality of Chinese patents 
and argue that China is making an innovation mirage. 
 
 
Figure 1 Number of Invention Applications in China and PCTs from China (1985-2018) 
 Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) website: https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/keyindex.htm.  
 Is China creating an innovation miracle or an innovation mirage? To date, despite widespread 
discussions on the issue of China’s innovation boom, strict and normative empirical studies are scarce. 
There are at least two challenges to answering the above question. The first concerns the identification 
of patent quality to obtain a better proxy for innovation instead of solely using patent quantity as most 
existing research does on China’s innovation. The second challenge is to choose a comprehensive 
national innovation development strategy that explains the behavior of the Chinese government 
multidimensionally rather than choosing one that focuses on one dimension (for example, a certain 
institution or policy) as existing hypotheses do. 
 We overcome the first challenge by identifying the patent quality with unique Chinese Patent 
Census Database that contains over 22.13 million patents. Patents have long been employed as an 
innovation indicator in both macro and micro studies, which was reviewed by Griliches (1990). 
Patents are important carriers of technical knowledge, the core of technological innovation when 
compared with other innovation indicators (See Appendix II for details). We use patents for two 
additional reasons. First, patents are significant indicators for evaluating the achievements of NTZs. 
Second, the Chinese Patent Census Database used in this study include abundant information, such 
as backward citations, forward citations, number of claims, etc., which allows us to identify patent 
quality and thus measure innovation, and even indigenous innovation, more accurately. To our best 
knowledge, no previous studies have incorporated these important indicators (e.g., Xie and Zhang, 
2014; Dang and Motohashi, 2015; He et al., 2017, 2018; Cai et al., 2018). In addition, the micro-level 












































surge in patents post-2009. Existing studies, however, are based on data up to 2014 at the latest (e.g., 
Cai et al., 2018), which can only be analyzed up until 2009 if the commonly used 5-year forward 
citation were to be employed as innovation indicator. Furthermore, given the fact that firms as the 
most important market entities and innovators were responsible for 67.60% of all patent publications 
in China from 1991 to 2018 (the rest were from universities, scientific research institutions, 
individuals, and others; see Figure A1 in Appendix I), this paper focuses on firms’ innovation 
activities by consistently matching Chinese Patent Census Database with Chinese Industrial Firm 
Census Database. 
 Regarding the second challenge, different hypotheses on the patent growth have been analyzed. 
1) Patent subsidy hypothesis. Both Li (2012) and Dang and Motohashi (2015) have found the patent 
subsidy policy to have resulted in an increase in the number of patents. However, the patent subsidy 
policy basically covered all provinces in the country by 2007, and the amount of the patent subsidy 
has barely increased ever since, except in Gansu Province, where the policy commenced in 2015. 
Thus, it is difficult to explain the acceleration in the number of patent applications after 2009.  
2) R&D subsidy hypothesis. From 2004 to 2017, the annual growth rate of government R&D 
expenditure and total R&D expenditure in China was 12.76% and 15.35%, respectively, which is far 
lower than the average annual growth rate of the number of patents (19.91%).1 However, several 
studies (e.g., Cincera, 1997; Hausman et al., 1984; Hu and Jefferson, 2004, 2009; Li, 2008) have 
found that the R&D elasticity of patents is less than 1, indicating a large proportion of the growth in 
the number of patents as not being explainable by the increase in R&D expenditure.  
3) Technology transfer policy hypothesis. China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) grew much faster 
in the period 2000–2009 (average annual growth rate of 6.67%) than it did in the period 2010–2018 
(average annual growth rate of 0.96%). Thus, it is difficult to explain the acceleration in the number 
of patent applications after 2009.  
4) the Friendly Court Hypothesis, which was first put forth by Kortum and Lerner (1989), further 
supported by evidence from Hall (2005) and Song (2006). It holds that a better intellectual property 
protection system is conducive to increasing the number of patent applications. However, reform of 
China’s patent system mainly took place in 2000,2 and thus, it remains difficult to explain the 
acceleration in the number of patent applications after 2009. In addition, the reform of China’s patent 
system fails to explain the accelerated growth in the number of PCT applications because the 
enhancement of domestic intellectual property protection is not directly related to international patent 
applications. Furthermore, the reform of China’s patent system cannot explain the slowing down of 
the growth of Chinese patents applied for by nonresidents either.  
In short, the above four hypotheses have explained some parts but no other important aspects of 
China’s patent growth such as the accelerated growth in the number of patent applications and PCT 
applications by resident after 2009, and the relative slowing down of patent applications by 
nonresidents after 2009. The rationale would be that these hypotheses are only analyzed from one 
dimension, whereas China’s national innovation development strategy has multidimensional tools, 
including a range of institutions, policies, and macro planning.  
 To better answer the above question, we need to start with a comprehensive strategy. China’s 
National Technology Zones (NTZs) meet the standard:  
1) The NTZs are place-based programs, which include a package of property rights institution, tax 
policy and land use policy (Wang, 2013). In fact, NTZs are important vehicles and experimental fields 
for the national innovation development strategy, including patent system reform, patent subsidy 
policy, technology transfer policy, macro planning etc. 
                                                             
1 Source: Data on R&D expenditure are taken from the 2018 China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology. R&D 
expenditure has been adjusted using the consumer price index (CPI), which is based on the 2018 China Price Statistical Yearbook. The 
average annual growth rate of patent counts is calculated based on data from the WIPO website. 
2 In preparation for China’s accession to the WTO, China’s patent law underwent significant revision in 2000, which greatly 
improved the protection of patent holders and basically complied with the principles of the internationally accepted TRIPS agreement. 
No major revisions have been made since then. As part of the Chinese version of the “Bayh–Dole Act”, China’s Ministry of Science 
and Technology issued Several Opinions on Strengthening the Protection and Management of Intellectual Property Rights Related to 
Science and Technology in 2000, which, for the first time, attribute the rights of intellectual property from implementing national 
science and technology projects to the undertaking units, rather than the government. 
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2) The establishment of NTZs is a pilot project in itself, thereby providing a good opportunity for 
policy evaluation.  
3) The direct and main goal of NTZs is to spur technological innovation. The NTZs in China include 
national economic and technical development zones (hereinafter “National Econ-Tech Zones”) and 
national high-tech industrial development zones (hereinafter “National High-Tech Zones”), both of 
which aim at promoting innovation. Until now, most related articles do not focus directly on the NTZs 
but on the Special Economic Zones (SEZ), studying SEZs in China (e.g., Wang, 2013; Alder et al., 
2013; Moberg, 2015; Zheng et al., 2016); Russia (Sosnovskikh, 2017); the Philippines (Ortega et al., 
2015); Tanzania (Farole, 2011); or in Europe (Liptáka et al., 2015). SEZs include more than NTZs, 
such as trade zones, tourism zones, etc., which directly aim at promoting trade, tourism, FDI, etc. 
 Our study is intended to empirically investigate the effects of the establishment of NTZs on firm 
innovation.  This paper aims to enrich the existing body of research in the following two ways. First, 
in contrast to previous studies on SEZs, which take R&D (e.g., Cao, 2004) and productivity (e.g., 
Wang, 2013; Alder et al., 2013) as innovation indicators, this study is the first, to our knowledge, to 
conduct analysis by regarding both the quantity and quality of patents as innovation indicators for 
China. Second, we provide strong evidence on whether and the extent to which China is creating an 
innovation miracle or mirage, thus deepening the understanding of China’s innovation boom. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces data matching and the 
staggered difference-in-differences (DID) regression model. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis 
on the effect of the establishment of NTZs on the overall level of innovation. We also conduct 
dynamic analysis and a series of robustness tests, particularly endogeneity analysis, using the 
connections of local officials in the central government as instrumental variables (IVs). Section 4 lays 
out the effects of NTZs on high-quality innovation by studying the effects of NTZs on innovation of 
high-tech industries and that on indigenous innovation. Section 5 investigates the innovation mirages 
in two ways: before and after the financial crisis; among firms with different ownerships. Section 6 
attempts to uncover the mechanisms between the establishment of NTZs and the innovation growth 
by both reviewing the NTZ literature and technology catch-up literature. Section 7 concludes and 
discusses policy implications. 
2 Data and Model 
2.1 NTZs and Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database  
 Since the establishment of the first National Econ-Tech Zone in 1984 and the first National High-
Tech Zone in 1988, numerous NTZs have been established in China. Technology Zones are a type of 
China’s SEZs. By the end of 2018, SEZs in China included: five Special Economic Areas, 16 coastal 
Open Cities, and various development zones, which further encompass Technology Zones, Special 
Customs Supervision Zones, Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zones, and Tourism Development 
Zones. According to the China Development Zone Audit Announcement Catalogue (2018 Edition), 
there are 219 National Econ-Tech Zones and 156 National High-Tech Zones in China (see Figure A2 
in Appendix I). The provincial distribution of NTZs is shown in Figure A3 in Appendix I. 
 This study focuses on NTZs for the following three reasons. First, we only analyze Technology 
Zones rather than other special economic zones because one of the main goals of the former is to 
propel technological innovation, while other special economic zones mainly target exports, FDI, or 
tourism. Second, we only analyze the National Technology Zones rather than Local (Provincial or 
Municipal) Technology Zones because the establishment of Local Technology Zones is likely to be 
the result of “political games” between the central government and local governments and may not 
accurately reflect the intentions of the national innovation development strategy.3 In addition, when 
                                                             
3 In 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission of China issued Specific Standards and Policy Boundaries for 
Cleaning up and Overhauling the Existing Development Zones (No. 2343 [2003]), which is the most powerful rectification in the 
history of the development zones, and the number of provincial development zones established in the following 2 years fell sharply. 
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compared with National Development Zones, Local Development Zones are obviously weaker in 
terms of management authority and preferential tax policies. Third, we simultaneously analyze the 
National Econ-Tech Zones and the National High-Tech Zones. Both are important components of the 
national innovation development strategy and are aimed at promoting technological innovation in 
industries such as electronic information, new materials, biomedicine, energy conservation, 
environmental protection, and equipment manufacturing. Previously, the National Econ-Tech Zones 
were meant to import foreign technology, while the National High-Tech Zones were aimed at taking 
advantage of domestic intellectual resources such as scientific research institutions and universities. 
However, the original difference has been fading over time. Apart from that, considering the 
diversified distribution of the two types of NTZs (only six out of 216 treatment municipalities have 
set up the two types of NTZs in the same year), we are able to obtain more treatment groups. In brief, 
simultaneous analysis of the two types of zones is conducive to a more comprehensive understanding 
of the national innovation development strategy. Later, we will also distinguish between the two types 
of NTZs in terms of their effects on innovation. 
 We employ Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database for the period 1995–2013, which are 
annually collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The dataset covers all above-scale 
firms 4 in industries such as mining and manufacturing as well as public utilities. The database 
includes various input/output indicators and financial indicators, with annual sample sizes in the range 
of 160,000–430,000. Previous studies mostly used 1998–2007 data (e.g., Brandt et al., 2012), 
excluding 2008–2013 data because the variable of value added is absent. However, this does not 
present a problem in this study because we do not need to calculate productivity. There are also some 
recent articles that employed the data up to 2013 (e.g., Chen and Chen, 2017; Tan et al., 2017). 
 Given the change in industry classifications in 2002 and 2011, this study reconciles the four-digit 
industry codes based on the National Economic Industry Classification (GB-T4754-2002). To test 
the representativeness of our sample, we pick up the total assets in 2004, 2008, and 2013 and compare 
them with total assets in the First Economic Census in 2004, the Second Economic Census in 2008, 
and the Third Economic Census in 2013, which include all industrial firms. Results show that the 
ratio of total assets in our data to those in the Economic Census data is approximately 90% in 2004; 
85% in 2008; and 79% in 2013. We have also made comparisons at the two-digit industry level, and 
the results also indicate that our data are highly representative. The only drawback is that the database 
does not include non-above-scale firms, meaning that the conclusion should be cautiously arrived at 
when it is extended to all industrial firms. 
 In addition, the number of above-scale firms annually released by the NBS is also like that in our 
data, with the only exception being that about a fourth of the sample in 2010 is missing (approximately 
110,000 firms). While Chen and Chen (2017) keep the data in 2010, Tan et al. (2017) simply drop 
them. We think that dropping the 2010 data would create a more serious impact on the panel 
regression. Therefore, we conservatively retain the data in 2010. The descriptive statistics for the 
major variables in 2010 is actually not very abnormal when compared with those in other years. Hence, 
this might have some, although not likely decisive, influence on our conclusion.  
 Finally, we identify the municipality that each NTZ is located in, with the help of a search engine, 
and then, we match NTZ data with Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database with municipality and 
year as the linking variables. 
2.2 Matching Chinese Patent Census Database with Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database  
 To our knowledge, this study is the first to employ the Chinese Full Sample Micro-level Patent 
Database (hereinafter referred to as “Chinese Patent Census Database”) up to 2018, which contains 
                                                             
However, the number of provincial development zones peaked in 2006 when the rectification was over and even exceeded the total 
established before that. 
4 The above-scale firms in Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database used here refer to the enterprises above designated size. Prior 
to 2006, the data covers non-SOEs with annual sales of more than RMB 5 million and all state-owned enterprises (SOEs). From 2007 
to 2010, it includes all firms with annual sales of at least RMB 5 million. After 2011, it includes all firms with annual sales of at least 
RMB 20 million. 
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over 22.13 million patents, including 8.94 million invention patents, 8.23 million utility models, and 
4.96 million industrial designs.5 The processing of patent data is effort-intensive (Xie and Zhang, 
2014; Lerner and Seru, 2017), particularly considering the large sample size and that the text 
documents are generally not machine-readable. To verify the representativeness of our data, we 
compare the numbers of the three types of patents in our database with those released in the Patent 
Statistics Annual Report. The numbers of patents from the two sources are almost equal for the three 
types of patents (See Figure A4 in Appendix III). The provincial distribution of invention applications 
is shown in Figure A5 in Appendix III. 
 When compared with the Chinese Patent Census Database used in previous studies (Xie and 
Zhang, 2014; Dang and Motohashi, 2015; He et al., 2017, 2018; Cai et al., 2018), our data have two 
significant advantages. First, our data encompass abundant information, including backward citations, 
forward citations, number of claims, etc., which helps better identify patent quality. Previous versions, 
however, include only basic information on patent quantity. Second, the time span is longer. Our data 
extend to the year 2018, while previous ones only covered the period up to 2014 at the latest (e.g., 
Cai et al., 2018). 
 We first divide applicants into five groups on the basis of their name: firms, universities, scientific 
research institutions, individuals, and others. Generally, firms are applicants with “company,” 
“factory,” “design institute,” etc. in their names. Universities are applicants with “university,” 
“school,” “college,” etc. in their names. Scientific research institutions are applicants with “research 
laboratory,” “academy of sciences,” “research center,” etc. in their names. Individuals are applicants 
with a person’s name. Others include associations, foundations, promotion associations, etc. To avoid 
double counting, if an applicant’s name contains terms related to both firms and other groups, it is 
classified simply as a firm. For example, both “the ** company of the ** university” and “the ** 
research laboratory of the ** company” are classified as firms. In addition, we reclassify some 
applicants as firms if their names are matched with the firm name in the Chinese Industrial Firm 
Census Database. About 7.36% of invention patents are applied for by more than one applicant. 
Generally, the first applicant is the one that contributed the most. If we concentrate only on the first 
applicant, our data sample shows that firms, universities, scientific research institutions, individuals, 
and others account for 67.60%, 14.62%, 1.97%, 15.16%, and 0.64% of the total invention patents, 
respectively.  
 Then we match the name of patent applicants with the firm name in the Chinese Industrial Firm 
Census Database. To improve the matching accuracy, we make some adjustments to the names prior 
to matching. For example, we deleted the terms “limited company,” “limited liability company,” 
“company,” “factory,” “province,” “city,” and “county” from firm names, as well as all spaces and 
punctuation marks. The matching results are shown in Table 1. We observe that in the period 1995–
2013, only 4.64% of above-scale industrial firms had patent applications but that 44.07% of domestic 
firm patents were applied for by above-scale industrial firms.6 That is to say, a very small proportion 
of above-scale industrial firms are responsible for nearly half of all patent applications by domestic 
firms. We identify whether the firm is domestic or foreign on the basis of its address in Chinese Patent 
Census Database. 
 Apart from that, by matching the 2008 China patent database with the 2008 Economic Census 
data, we find that patent applications by non-above-scale industrial firms are only about 8.47% of 
those by all domestic firms. The remaining patents are mostly applied for by the service sector. 
Therefore, we have analyzed most patents (83.88%) by the industrial sector, which has greater 
learning capacity and more learning externalities than do other sectors (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014). 
 
                                                             
5 The data is from the State Intellectual Property Office of China (hereinafter “SIPO”), and provided by Shenzhen Degaohang 
Intellectual Property Data Technology Co., Ltd. 
6 This result is lower than the figure (58.80%) obtained by Xie and Zhang (2014) on the basis of 1998–2009 data because they 
have not considered the entry and exit of firms during the sample period and have only used the firm name for matching instead of 
using both the firm name and year. We repeated the matching using only the firm name for data from 1995 to 2013 and obtained a 
figure of 56.80%, which is very close to the result obtained by them. 
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Proportion of Above-scale Industrial Firms with Patents  
Number of Above-scale Industrial 
Firms with Patent Applications 
67,381 79,245 156,620 65,151 225,705 
Number of Above-scale Industrial 
Firms 
4,859,810 4,859,810 4,859,810 4,859,810 4,859,810 
Proportion of Above-scale Industrial 
Firms with Patent Applications 1.39% 1.63% 3.22% 1.34% 
4.64% 
Proportion of Patent Applications by Above-scale Industrial Firms 
Number of Patent Applications by 
Above-scale Industrial Firms 
288,121 351,951 853,481 570,775 2,064,328 
Number of Patent Applications by 
Domestic Firms 
767,626 770,111 1,882,998 1,263,528 4,684,263 
Proportion of Patent Applications by 
Above-scale Industrial Firms 37.53% 45.70% 45.33% 45.17% 44.07% 
Source: Author calculations based on our matching data. 
 To verify the validity of our matching, we compare the matching results with macro data released 
by the government. The SIPO (State Intellectual Property Office of China) issued the Report on 
Patent Activities and Economic Performances of Above-scale Industrial Firms in China (2012 and 
2013), which released data on the proportion of above-scale industrial firms with patent applications 
in 2008 and 2011–2013 (see (1b) in Table 2). On the basis of patent applications by above-scale 
industrial firms obtained from the NBS website and the total patent applications released in Patent 
Statistics Annual Report, we can reckon the proportion of patent applications by above-scale 
industrial firms in total patent applications (see (2b) in Table 2). In general, our matching is in line 
with the official data. 
 
Table 2 Our Matching V.S. Official Data 
 
Year Proportion of Above-scale Industrial Firms 
with Patent Applications 
Proportion of Patent Applications by 
Above-scale Industrial Firms in 
Total Patent Applications 
 (1a) Our Matching (1b) Official Data (2a) Our Matching (2b) Official Data 
2013 12.11% 13.10% 26.20% 25.21% 
2012 11.68% 12.20% 24.92% 25.39% 
2011 9.88% 10.30% 24.06% 25.08% 
2008 4.05% 4.20% 19.84% 20.95% 
Source: “Our Matching” represents the matching between Chinese Patent Census Database and Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database. “Official Data” 
is from the Report on Patent Activities and Economic Performances of Above-scale Industrial Firms in China, the National Bureau of Statistics website, and 
Patent Statistics Annual Report. 
 
2.3 Model Specification and Descriptive Statistics 
 Difference-in-differences (DID) is one of the major methods employed in policy evaluation 
because it alleviates the endogeneity problem to some extent with two differences: one between 
periods, which is the difference between the periods before and after the policy intervention, and the 
other between groups, which is the difference between the treatment group and the control group. The 
traditional DID method is used for a one-off policy shock. However, the National Technology Zone 
pilot is a kind of staggered policy. Therefore, we use the staggered DID method for our estimations. 




𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + γ𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝛿𝛿 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                      (1) 
 
 where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  represents the innovation of firm 𝑑𝑑 in year 𝑡𝑡. The innovation indicator can be patent 
quantity, average patent quality, and innovation (quantity multiplied by average quality). 𝛽𝛽0 is the 
intercept term; 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 is the firm fixed effect; 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is the time fixed effect; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the random error 
term. 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  is the core explanatory variable, the coefficient of which tells the impact of the 
establishment of NTZs on firm innovation. If the municipality was granted an NTZ in year t, then we 
set 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 at 1 for the municipality in and after year t, and 0 otherwise. If the municipality was granted 
the second NTZ in year t + m, then we would set 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 at 2 for the municipality in and after year t + 
m, and so on. More than one NTZ being authorized in one municipality in the same year is considered 
to be one NTZ in the basic regression model. We will later consider the number and the area of NTZs 
granted in one municipality in the same year. 
 ∑𝛿𝛿 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  represents a set of control variables that might affect firm innovation. On the basis of the 
existing literature and the variables in the Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database, we choose the 
following firm control variables:  
① Scale – this is measured by the number of employees. According to Schumpeter’s (1934) 
hypothesis, larger firms are more innovative;  
② Export – this is measured by the real value of exports. According to the demand-pull hypothesis 
on innovation first put forth by Schmookler (1966), demand in larger markets benefits innovation. 
Therefore, exports might promote innovation by increasing market demand;  
③ Capital intensity (Kintensity) – this is measured by the ratio of total assets to the number of 
employees. In general, capital-intensive industries, such as information and communication, have 
more patents than labor-intensive industries such as food and textiles do; 
④ Age – this is measured by the period between the current year and the year that the firm first 
occurs in the sample. Schumpeter’s (1934) “creative destruction” theory states that older innovations 
are gradually replaced by new innovations, which are usually created by young firms; 
⑤ Administrative subordination (subordination): there are 10 levels of administrative 
subordination (with code in parentheses) in Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database: the central 
government (10); provinces (20); municipalities (40); counties (50); streets (61); towns (62); 
townships (63); neighborhood committees (71); village committees (72); and others (90). These codes 
are set by the NBS of China and are basically based on the administrative power of the authority. This 
is the variable with Chinese characteristics. Firms with higher-level administrative subordination 
obtain more government resources. Whether these resources benefit innovation depends on how firms 
use them; 
⑥ Ownership – this can be divided into six types. They are as follows (with code in parentheses): 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (1); collective firms (2); Hong Kong-, Macao-, and Taiwan-based 
firms (3); foreign firms (4); legal-person firms (5); and private firms (6). This is also a variable with 
Chinese characteristics. China’s economic transition has resulted in the many various types of firm 
ownership.  
 To alleviate the problem of abnormal value, we winsorize by 0.01 the following variables: Scale, 
Export, Kintensity, and Age, and then, we take the logarithm of these variables. To better alleviate the 
problem of missing variables, we use a two-way fixed effects model, in which the firm fixed effect 
and the time fixed effect are simultaneously controlled for. In addition, considering the huge gaps in 
innovation among provinces, we also add the dummy variable of province. Even though we have 
included firm fixed effect, the province dummy variable further controls the impact of firm mobility 
among provinces. We use standard errors that explain the clustering of firms to obtain more stable 
results. The descriptive statistics of variables in the basic regressions is shown in Table 3. Some 






Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Basic Regressions 





Patent 4,859,810 7.606 39.62 0 985.5 
Invention 4,859,810 2.905 21.93 0 903.9 
Invention (granted) 4,859,810 1.824 16.45 0 849.5 
Invention (ungranted) 4,859,810 1.589 15.61 0 817.1 
Utility Model 4,859,810 4.680 28.99 0 923.8 
Industrial Design 4,859,810 2.061 20.88 0 704.9 
Quality 
Indicators 
Invention 4,859,810 2.035 17.08 0 447.7 
Invention (granted) 4,859,810 1.517 15.12 0 499.7 




Invention 4,859,810 4.500 32.95 0 1033 
Invention (granted) 4,859,810 2.992 26.37 0 1004 
Invention (ungranted) 4,859,810 2.386 22.82 0 897.5 





Scale 4,828,657 4.853 1.166 1.386 7.883 
Export 4,859,810 2.043 4.007 0 12.59 
Kintensity 4,779,103 3.775 1.379 0.070 7.386 
Age 4,780,459 2.038 0.873 0 3.951 
Subordination 4,859,809 73.86 21.96 10 90 
Ownership 4,859,384 4.421 1.776 1 6 
3 Effects of NTZs on the Overall Level of Innovation 
3.1 Effects of NTZs on Patent Quantity 
 We first consider only patent quantity. We analyze all types of patents, including invention patents, 
utility models, and industrial designs. Invention patents can be further divided into granted inventions 
and ungranted inventions. Empirical results with the quantum of these types of patents as dependent 
variables are shown in Table 4. The DID coefficients in the six equations without control variables 
are significantly positive (see Panel A). After the control variables are added, the goodness of fit 
increases, and the six DID coefficients are still significantly positive (see Panel B). In addition, the 
values of these coefficients are relatively robust. Hence, the establishment of NTZs has resulted in 
growth in the numbers of all types of patents. 
 Now we come to an analysis of the coefficients of each control variable. The coefficients of Scale 
are all significantly positive, consistent with Schumpeter’s hypothesis. The coefficients of Export are 
all significantly positive, supporting Schmookler’s demand-pull hypothesis. This also suggests that 
to some extent, the recent rise of new protectionism may harm innovation. The coefficients of 
Kintensity are all significantly positive; capital-intensive industries contribute more to innovation 
than labor-intensive industries do. The declining demographic dividend in the past decade in China 
makes it increasingly difficult for China to obtain a comparative advantage through cheap labor. 
China is undergoing the important historical process of changing from labor-intensive to capital-
intensive industries. In other words, the decline in demographic dividend is likely to force China to 
focus on innovation (Wei et al., 2017). The coefficients of Age are all significantly negative, 
indicating that younger firms might be more innovative, which, to some extent, benefits from China’s 
long-term market-oriented reform. The coefficients of subordination are not highly significant in the 
equations related to inventions; however, they are significantly negative in the equations related to 
utility models and industrial designs. This suggests that increased government resources might only 
bring more low-quality patents related to utility models and industrial designs but not more low-
quality patents related to inventions. The coefficient of ownership is significantly negative in the 
equation related to granted invention but insignificant in the equation relating to ungranted invention. 
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This, to some extent, indicates that SOEs have certain advantages over non-SOEs in granted invention 
applications, which are of higher quality than ungranted ones. 
Table 4 The Impact of the Establishment of NTZs on Patent Quantity 
Dependent 
Variable 




Utility Model Industrial 
Design 
Panel A：Without Controls 
DID 2.2643*** 1.0520*** 0.3763*** 0.8595*** 1.3299*** 0.5613*** 
 (0.1051) (0.0646) (0.0480) (0.0484) (0.0774) (0.0568) 
R square 0.0362 0.0259 0.0181 0.0159 0.0319 0.0036 
Obs 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 
Panel B：With Controls 
DID 2.3064*** 1.0760*** 0.3898*** 0.8762*** 1.3577*** 0.5652*** 
 (0.1063) (0.0654) (0.0487) (0.0492) (0.0783) (0.0578) 
Scale 2.1303*** 0.6439*** 0.3512*** 0.3387*** 1.1260*** 0.8067*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0432) (0.0341) (0.0307) (0.0521) (0.0356) 
Export 0.6183*** 0.3064*** 0.2109*** 0.1740*** 0.4294*** 0.1584*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0089) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0108) (0.0077) 
Kintensity 1.8749*** 0.8436*** 0.5514*** 0.4791*** 1.2297*** 0.5120*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0221) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0275) (0.0185) 
Age -1.2058*** -0.8122*** -0.5566*** -0.4835*** -0.9194*** -0.1050*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0421) (0.0322) (0.0293) (0.0514) (0.0341) 
Subordination -0.0080*** -0.0029 -0.0031* -0.0016 -0.0061*** -0.0029** 
 (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0015) 
Ownership -0.0971** -0.0569** -0.0638*** -0.0217 -0.0941*** -0.0575*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0269) (0.0208) (0.0184) (0.0325) (0.0203) 
R square 0.0403 0.0288 0.0203 0.0175 0.0353 0.0045 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here includes invention, utility model and industrial design. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A includes regressions without control variables. Panel B includes regressions with all the six control variables 
mentioned above.  
3.2 Effects of NTZs on Patent Quality and Innovation 
 The results presented in Table 4 have shown that the establishment of NTZs has significantly 
increased patent quantity, which, however, cannot reflect innovation well. In fact, there might be 
many low-quality patents, which do not necessarily represent innovation. This is one of the major 
reasons for which some people argue that China is making an innovation mirage. Therefore, the 
quality of patents must be seriously considered. 
 Forward citation is the most used indicator of patent quality, which first appears in bibliometrics 
studies (e.g., Campbell and Nieves, 1979; Carpenter et al., 1981; Carpenter and Narin, 1983). 
Trajtenberg (1990) was the first to apply the number of forward citations to economic research, and 
it has been widely used as an innovation indicator ever since. The most common way is to add up the 
number of patents with the number of forward citations as the weight to represent innovation (e.g., 
Arora et al., 2001; Harhoff et al., 2003; Hsu et al., 2014). 
 The biggest issue of using forward citations is truncation; that is to say, the number of citations 
after the last year of the data can never be known, and patents disclosed later face more serious 
truncation issues than those disclosed earlier. Because of this, following Aghion et al. (2019), we use 
the number of forward citations within 5 years since the patent’s publishing, to measure patent quality. 
In fact, the number of invention patent citations within 5 years is as high as 76.20% of all citations 
by the end of 2018. In addition, the gap between the last year of Chinese Patent Census Database and 
that of Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database is 5 years, which allows us to use this indicator. 
Thus, unless otherwise specified, patent quality is measured by the number of forward citations within 
5 years. We analyze only invention patents when considering patent quality because there are few 
forward citations for utility models and industrial designs. Unless otherwise specified, it is only 
invention patents that are referred to by “patents” in the following part. 
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 We first use only average patent quality as the dependent variable. The results are shown in 
Columns 2–4 of Table 5. Then, we simultaneously consider the quantity and quality of patents. 
Following Aghion et al. (2019), we multiply the number of patents by the average quality of patents 
to obtain an innovation index. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality + 1). Here we 
use “Average Patent Quality + 1” rather than “Average Patent Quality” so that even if the number of 
citations is zero, the patent is still considered to be of some value because the patent data that we use 
have already been examined and published, although perhaps not yet granted, by SIPO. In so doing, 
there would also be fewer zero observations in our regression. 
 We use the new index of innovation as the dependent variable, and the regression results are 
shown in Columns 5–7 of Table 5. The DID coefficients are all significantly positive, whether we add 
the control variables or not. After adding the control variables, the DID coefficients are slightly higher 
and the goodness of fit is improved. Besides, the sign and significance of the coefficients of control 
variables are basically the same as those shown in Table 4. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
establishment of NTZs has improved the quality of patents. Even if we consider both the quantity and 
quality of patents, the establishment of NTZs still has improved innovation. In other words, China is 
not making an innovation mirage. 
Table 5 The Impact of the Establishment of NTZs on Patent Quality 
Dependent 
Variable 
Average Patent Quality Innovation 




Panel A：Without Controls 
DID 0.1630*** 0.1012*** 0.1240*** 1.1903*** 0.4531*** 0.9599*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0317) (0.0260) (0.0852) (0.0671) (0.0626) 
R square 0.0086 0.0064 0.0052 0.0206 0.0138 0.0128 
Obs 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 
Panel B：With Controls 
DID 0.1699*** 0.1074*** 0.1295*** 1.2208*** 0.4721*** 0.9815*** 
 (0.0357) (0.0323) (0.0265) (0.0863) (0.0680) (0.0636) 
Scale 0.8086*** 0.5947*** 0.4429*** 1.2885*** 0.8149*** 0.6779*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0252) (0.0206) (0.0615) (0.0508) (0.0434) 
Export 0.1529*** 0.1243*** 0.0954*** 0.4325*** 0.3105*** 0.2482*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0129) (0.0105) (0.0091) 
Kintensity 0.4702*** 0.3637*** 0.2815*** 1.2253*** 0.8404*** 0.6957*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0135) (0.0110) (0.0320) (0.0255) (0.0228) 
Age -0.3426*** -0.2999*** -0.2088*** -1.1002*** -0.7980*** -0.6506*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0248) (0.0191) (0.0613) (0.0497) (0.0416) 
Subordination -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0040 -0.0045* -0.0029  
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0021) 
Ownership -0.0302 -0.0437*** -0.0094 -0.0847** -0.1007*** -0.0301 
 (0.0192) (0.0169) (0.0135) (0.0402) (0.0326) (0.0270) 
R square 0.0098 0.0073 0.0059 0.0231 0.0156 0.0143 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Patent quality is measured by five-year forward citations *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A includes regressions without control variables. Panel B includes regressions with all the 
six control variables mentioned above. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). 
3.3 Dynamic Effects of the Establishment of NTZs 
 The above empirical results have identified the positive effects of the establishment of NTZs on 
innovation. However, the dynamic effects remain to be investigated. Hence, we replace the DID 
variable with a series of year dummy variables ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
10
𝑇𝑇=−10，T≠−1 . 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 means the Tth year before or 
after the establishment of NTZs in municipality i . If year − year𝑖𝑖0 = T , then 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 = 1 , and 0 




 In line with existing studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2010; Wang, 2013), we only consider the 10-year 
period before and after the establishment of NTZs. If year − year𝑖𝑖0 ≤ −10, then 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−10 = 1, and 
zero otherwise. Similarly, if year − year𝑖𝑖0 ≥ 10 , then 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖10 = 1 , and 0 otherwise. We ignore the 
dummy variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1, and thus, the coefficients of all other dummy variables are relative to the effect 
of the year right before the establishment of NTZs.  
 Because the establishment of different NTZs took place in different years for a given municipality, 
we take the principle of proximity when defining year𝑖𝑖0. Assuming that municipality A has been 
granted an NTZ in 2000, 2005, and 2009, then year𝑖𝑖0 equals 2000 for the period 1995–2004; 2005 
for the period 2005–2008; and 2009 for the period 2009–2013. 
 Figure 2 provides the coefficient and 95% confidence interval of each dummy variable. The 
innovation effect is positive right after the establishment of NTZs. Furthermore, the positive effect is 
strengthened over time, which might be attributed to the increasingly mature state–market 
relationship with the ongoing process of trial and error. However, prior to the establishment of NTZs, 
the coefficient of each dummy variable is insignificantly different from 0, and without obvious trend. 
This, to a certain extent, indicates that the endogeneity problem related to the staggered DID 
regression is not very serious. 
 
Figure 2 Dynamic Effects of the Establishment of NTZs on Innovation 
3.4 Robustness Analysis 
 To verify whether our results are robust, we conduct a series of robustness analyses (See 
Appendix III for details). 
 First, we employ two alternative indicators of patent quality: one-year forward citation and the 
number of claims, in the event that 5-year forward citation is not good enough. Second, we consider 
the number and area of NTZs, which might also significantly influence innovation. Third, we analyze 
the effects of National Econ-Tech Zones and National High-Tech Zones on innovation separately in 
order to test whether both have positive effects as the NTZs do. Fourth, we investigate the influence 
of firm mobility among municipalities on innovation, considering the possible spillover effects or 
beggar-thy-neighbor effects. Fifth, we come to study the endogeneity issues by drawing the scatter 
plot between the year that a city is authorized the first NTZ and the innovation rank 2 years prior to 
the NTZ being authorized and also by conducting 2SLS regression with the connections of local 
officials in the central government as the IVs. Sixth, we drop the sample in the municipalities that 
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 We redo these regressions and all the results are robust, providing strong evidence for our basic 
conclusion that the establishment of NTZs does exert positive effects on the overall level of 
innovation. 
4 Effects of NTZs on High-quality Innovation 
 The preceding analysis shows the promotional effects of the establishment of NTZs on the overall 
level of innovation. In order to provide further evidence as to the innovation miracle, we investigate 
the effects of NTZs on high-quality innovation, which we refer to as innovation in high-tech industries 
and indigenous innovation. 
 High-tech industries in China have experienced great development since the National High 
Technology Research and Development Program (“863” plan) in 1986, and both the value added and 
export of high-tech industries of China has surpassed those of the US. However, the ratio of the labor 
productivity of high-tech industries in China to that in the US only increased slightly from 8.36% in 
2000 to 8.66% in 2013,7 indicating that the innovation of high-tech industries in China still lagged 
far behind that in the US. Rather than utilizing labor productivity, we use patent as innovation 
indicator to re-examine the innovation of high-tech industries. 
 In addition, the classical models on trade and innovation (e.g., Krugman, 1979; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991a, 1991b) all assume indigenous innovation as coming from developed countries, with 
developing countries only carrying out imitative innovation. As a developing country, China is behind 
in indigenous innovation, and its core technologies are heavily dependent on developed countries, 
which can be seen from the US sanctions on chips of Huawei and ZTE since 2018. Now we use patent 
data to review the effects of innovation strategy on indigenous innovation. 
4.1 Effects of NTZs on High-tech Industries 
 To identify the innovation promotion effect on high-tech industries, we set a new dummy variable: 
medium- and low-tech industry (hereinafter “Medium-Low”), which takes a value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to the medium- and low-tech industries, and 0 if it belongs to high-tech industries. 
Subsequently, we incorporate the interaction term between Medium-Low and DID into regression 
model (1), leaving all other variables unchanged. The classification of high-tech industries springs 
from the Catalogue of Statistical Classifications of High-tech Industries. To harmonize different 
editions of classification, we drop the “nuclear fuel processing” industry. 
 The results are shown in Table 6. Because of space limitation, we have not listed the regression 
results with patent quantity or average patent quality as dependent variables, which are like the results 
with innovation as the dependent variable. The coefficients of the interaction item are all significantly 
negative, which indicate that the innovation effects of the establishment of NTZs on high-tech 
industries are larger than those on medium- and low-tech industries. Both the DID coefficient and the 
coefficient of interaction item are significant, and the sum of the two coefficients is positive, which 
means that the establishment of NTZs has also promoted innovation of medium- and low-tech 
industries. However, the sum of the two coefficients is much smaller than the corresponding DID 
coefficient in Table 5. This indicates that the innovation effect of the establishment of NTZs on 
medium- and low-tech industries is still very limited. The reason for this would be that the main goal 
of NTZs is to promote the innovation of high-tech industries; however, the innovation spillovers from 
high-tech industries to medium- and low-tech industries are far from adequate. 




                                                             
7 The value added of high-tech industries in China and the U.S. is from the National Science Foundation of the U.S (in current 
US dollars). Employment of high-tech industries in China is from China Statistics Yearbook on High Technology Industry, and 
Employment of high-tech industries in the U.S. is from the National Science Foundation of the US. 
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Table 6 Innovation Effects of the Establishment of NTZs on High-tech Industries 
 Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
DID 6.4153*** 4.3130*** 4.0328*** 6.3147*** 4.2455*** 3.9674*** 
 (0.3161) (0.2565) (0.2355) (0.3179) (0.2588) (0.2372) 
Medium-Low 
*DID 
-5.7399*** -4.2403*** -3.3758*** -5.6009*** -4.1489*** -3.2831*** 
(0.3165) (0.2565) (0.2359) (0.3184) (0.2589) (0.2378) 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0214 0.0145 0.0133 0.0238 0.0163 0.0148 
Obs 4859810 4859810 4859810 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
4.2 Effects of NTZs on Indigenous Innovation 
 Research abounds on indigenous innovation, and various indicators have been used to measure 
indigenous innovation. However, indicators utilized to measure indigenous innovation in China are 
still based on patent quantity. Li et al. (2016) directly employ the number of patent applications as a 
proxy for indigenous innovation. Wu and Liu (2013) go even further and measure indigenous 
innovation in terms of the number of invention grants. Obviously, invention grants are of higher 
quality when compared with invention applications. 
 However, all the above indicators are limited to patent quantity, without identifying the quality. 
The quantity of patents, whether patent applications or grants, is very limited in representing 
indigenous innovation. There are still large amounts of invention grants that are in actuality imitative 
innovation, particularly for developing countries. Therefore, we use the indicator of science relation 
to measure indigenous innovation. What we have used above as patent quality indicator is based on 
forward citations. Now we come to backward citations, which include not just patents but also 
scientific documents (e.g., research reports and academic papers). Science relation refers to the ratio 
of the number of scientific documents to all the backward citations, which have been used in many 
papers (e.g., Albert et al., 1991; Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Our data shows that the ratio of firms with 
science relation larger than zero to all firms is approximately 0.89%, but that to firms with patents is 
approximately 39.20%. We first calculate the science relation of each patent, and then, we calculate 
the average science relation of all patents for each firm, that is, the average indigenous innovation. 
We obtain indigenous innovation by multiplying average indigenous innovation by patent quantity. 8 
The results are shown in Table 7. 
 We mainly focus on Columns 5–7, where indigenous innovation is the dependent variable. All 
the DID coefficients are significantly positive, which indicates that the establishment of NTZs has 
promoted indigenous innovation. If we come to Columns 2–4, where average indigenous innovation 
is the dependent variable, we would find an interesting story. The DID coefficient for granted patents 
is significantly positive, but it is insignificant for ungranted patents. This means that the establishment 
of NTZs might have encouraged the application of patents with relatively low quality; however, the 
SIPO is very strict when authorizing patents, which makes the granted patents of relatively higher 
quality.  
 In addition, some patent citations are self-citations, which have little to do with indigenous 
innovation. Therefore, we first calculate the number of self-citations by identifying whether the 
patents in the backward citations are being applied for by the same applicants. When calculating self-
citations, we consider all the applicants rather than the first applicants as Trajtenberg et al. (1997) do. 
Then we subtract the self-citations from the total backward citations, on the basis of which we obtain 
a new indicator of science relation, and then, we obtain the new indicator of average indigenous 
innovation and that of indigenous innovation. We redo the regressions by replacing the old dependent 
                                                             
8 To note that unlike the calculation of innovation, the formula of indigenous innovation is a little bit different: Indigenous 
Innovation = Patent Quantity × Average Indigenous Innovation. We do not use “Average Indigenous Innovation+1” here because the 
requirement for indigenous innovation is much higher than that for innovation. In other words, patent being published mean would 
mean innovation but don’t necessarily mean indigenous innovation. 
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variables with the new ones, and the results are basically the same. These results are not listed because 
of space limitations.  
 In sum, the establishment of NTZs has promoted indigenous innovation.  
 
Table 7 The Impact of the Establishment of NTZs on Indigenous Innovation 
Dependent 
Variable 
Average Indigenous Innovation Indigenous Innovation 
Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
DID 0.1832*** 0.1461** 0.0805 0.4069*** 0.1854** 0.2182*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0622) (0.0522) (0.1043) (0.0867) (0.0713) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0070 0.0053 0.0037 0.0092 0.0067 0.0044 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Indigenous Innovation = Patent Quantity × Average Indigenous Innovation. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
5 The Establishment of NTZs and Innovation Mirage 
5.1 Innovation Effects before and after the Financial Crisis 
 Previous relevant studies (e.g., Wang, 2013; Moberg, 2015; Zheng et al., 2016) have not 
conducted comparative analyses of innovation effects of the establishment of NTZs before and after 
the financial crisis. In fact, both economic development and innovation strategy have experienced 
great changes. Following the 2008 financial crisis, China’s economic growth has slowed down 
significantly, and the old engine of development, cheap labor, has been declining. The average wage 
in China is higher than that in most non-OECD countries and three times higher than that in India 
(Wei et al., 2017). Technological innovation has become the new key engine of development for 
China in the new era. Following the financial crisis, China has issued a series of national innovation 
development strategies, and the establishment of NTZs has also experienced a highpoint. During 
2009–2013, there were 156 National Econ-Tech Zones (71.23% of the total) and 60 National High-
Tech Zones (38.46% of the total) being established (see Figure A2 in Appendix I). Therefore, we 
divide the period into two stages: pre-financial crisis (1995–2008) and post-financial crisis (2009–
2013). Considering the possible impact of the municipalities that had been authorized NTZs during 
1995–2008, we drop these municipalities when studying the situation after the financial crisis. 
 The results in Panel C of Table 8 show that the DID coefficients are all significantly positive, 
meaning that NTZs established in both periods have promoted firm innovation. The DID coefficients 
are also significantly positive for patent quantity in both periods (see Panel A). However, when it 
comes to patent quality (Panel B), the DID coefficients are significantly positive before the financial 
crisis but insignificant thereafter. This means that NTZs established before the financial crisis did 
promote patent quality but that those established after the crisis failed.  
 The explanation is that NTZs were granted sporadically before the financial crisis, which seemed 
to be demand-driven, and thus, they generally met the needs of economic development. However, the 
massive NTZs granted after the financial crisis seemed to be supply-driven and might have exceeded 
the needs of economic development at least in the short run.  
 Furthermore, quantified goals for patent growth have been put forward in the macro planning 
after the financial crisis, which aggravate the innovation effect of NTZs. The 12th five-year plan made 
by the central government of China in 2010 incorporated the quantified goal for patent growth into 
the five-year plan for the first time. The National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020) further 
highlighted the quantified goal for PCT growth. While the perfection of competitive market system 
and patent system reform, which indicates a stronger market hand, is likely to attract nonresidents to 
apply for patents in China, macro planning, which indicates stronger government hand, might not. 
This would explain the relative slowdown of patent applications by nonresidents after 2009. Li and 
Zhou (2005) provide a promotion tournament hypothesis to explain China’s miracle. The hypothesis 
16 
 
claims that, with the incentive role of personnel control, the central government can realize its 
quantified goal for GDP (gross domestic product) growth without spending additional economic 
resources. When it comes to its quantified goal for patent growth, the incentive role of personnel 
control works in a similar way, which brings a boost in the number of patents (and PCTs) after 2009. 
However, the quantified goal for patent growth involves only patent quantity, instead of patent quality. 
This relatively radical macro planning would, to a large extent, help explain the innovation mirage 
after the financial crisis.  
 Of course, the time frame that can be used to analyze the effect of the establishment of NTZs 
after the financial crisis is no more than 5 years, which might have influenced the results. However, 
as shown in Figure 2, the establishment of NTZs takes effect instantly, and thus, time frame would 
not be a major factor influencing the outcome. Therefore, it would be safe to conclude that the 
establishment of NTZs after the financial crisis is relatively irrational and fails to promote patent 
quality at least in the short run. In other words, it is making an innovation mirage, that is, rapid but 
relatively low-quality patent growth. 




Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
Panel A：Patent Quantity  
DID 1.1644*** 0.7150*** 0.6543*** 0.8899*** 0.3474*** 0.7265*** 
 (0.1146) (0.0883) (0.0766) (0.0773) (0.0530) (0.0650) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0110 0.0081 0.0062 0.0080 0.0050 0.0052 
Obs 3019015 3019015 3019015 1487114 1487114 1487114 
Panel B: Average Patent Quality 
DID 1.0367*** 0.7263*** 0.6121*** 0.0488 0.0454 0.0524 
 (0.0940) (0.0819) (0.0638) (0.0526) (0.0478) (0.0417) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0078 0.0058 0.0045 0.0007 0.0004 0.0006 
Obs 3019015 3019015 3019015 1487114 1487114 1487114 
Panel C: Innovation 
DID 1.9749*** 1.2714*** 1.1125*** 0.9491*** 0.3990*** 0.7732*** 
 (0.1833) (0.1484) (0.1201) (0.1047) (0.0793) (0.0862) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0112 0.0081 0.0064 0.0031 0.0014 0.0026 
Obs 3019015 3019015 3019015 1487114 1487114 1487114 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
5.2 Innovation Effects on Firms with Different Ownerships 
 We divided firms into three categories on the basis of ownership: SOEs, privately-owned 
enterprises (POEs), and foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs).9 The results are shown in Table 9. We 
first concentrate on Panel C. All the DID coefficients are significantly positive, meaning that the 
establishment of NTZs has promoted innovation for all types of firms.  
 Now we look at Panel A and Panel B. All the DID coefficients are significantly positive in Panel 
A. When it comes to patent quality (Panel B), however, only the DID coefficients for SOEs are all 
significantly positive. The DID coefficient for granted patents of POEs is insignificant, and the three 
DID coefficients for FOEs are all insignificant, which, to some extent, argues against the 
aforementioned technology transfer hypothesis. That is to say, the positive effects of the establishment 
of NTZs on average patent quality for POEs and FOEs are inferior to those for SOEs. The reason for 
                                                             
9 To better control the heterogeneity of firms with different ownerships, we have divided firms into six categories in previous 
parts. Now, we divide firms into three categories to better investigate the implications of different ownerships. SOEs include SOEs and 




this would be that fair competition between SOEs and non-SOEs is still limited in China. In fact, it 
was not until 2019 that the central government of China put forth the principle of “Neutral 
Competition”, mainly referring to fair competition between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
 Figure 3 shows the annual invention applications by firms with different ownerships. The 
(descending) order of the number of invention applications is POE, FOE, and SOE, respectively. After 
the financial crisis, the growth of invention applications by all types of firms has accelerated, and that 
by POE is much faster. Therefore, the relatively limited effect of the establishment of NTZs on the 
quality of patent applications by POEs and FOEs would indicate a certain innovation mirage in total. 
 In sum, the establishment of NTZs has brought patent quality enhancement for SOEs but not for 
non-SOEs (particularly FOEs), which might be ascribed to the imperfect market institution. In fact, 
it was not until 2019 that the central government of China proposed to unify the treatment of domestic 
and foreign investment, and put forward the principle of neutral competition between SOE and non-
SOE. 
Table 9 Innovation Effects of the Establishment of NTZs on Firms with Different Ownerships 
 SOEs POEs FOEs 












Panel A：Patent Quantity 
DID 1.4950*** 0.9615*** 0.8281*** 1.1836*** 0.3418*** 1.0550*** 0.6285*** 0.2533** 0.4852*** 
 (0.2217) (0.1782) (0.1550) (0.0776) (0.0544) (0.0610) (0.1351) (0.1062) (0.0981) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0287 0.0224 0.0192 0.0272 0.0186 0.0168 0.0262 0.0195 0.0149 
Obs 937542 937542 937542 2888567 2888567 2888567 875256 875256 875256 
Panel B: Average Patent Quality 
DID 0.6172*** 0.5117*** 0.2647*** 0.1238*** 0.0630 0.1320*** 0.0984 0.0579 0.0726 
 (0.1251) (0.1157) (0.0885) (0.0457) (0.0413) (0.0344) (0.0679) (0.0618) (0.0496) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0096 0.0083 0.0063 0.0085 0.0062 0.0052 0.0094 0.0071 0.0054 
Obs 937542 937542 937542 2888567 2888567 2888567 875256 875256 875256 
Panel C: Innovation 
DID 1.9904*** 1.3715*** 1.0282*** 1.2981*** 0.3918*** 1.1687*** 0.7141*** 0.2987** 0.5424*** 
 (0.3051) (0.2578) (0.2089) (0.1037) (0.0792) (0.0794) (0.1738) (0.1419) (0.1244) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0225 0.0175 0.0149 0.0211 0.0137 0.0133 0.0215 0.0154 0.0124 
Obs 937542 937542 937542 2888567 2888567 2888567 875256 875256 875256 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 




































































6 Mechanisms of the Innovation Effects 
 There are some articles investigating the mechanisms of the effect of NTZs on firm innovation 
based on case studies. Wang and Wang (1998) study the technological learning of Zhongguancun, an 
NTZ in Beijing. They find that domestic institutes (universities, research institutions, and domestic 
firms) are playing an increasingly important role when compared with foreign firms in the learning 
process and claim that the self-sustained innovativeness is critical for domestic firms to avoid reliance 
on foreign technologies. Lu (2001) investigates the information technology industry in 
Zhongguancun and finds local technological knowledge to be critical for the rise of technology firms. 
Zhou and Xin (2003) further investigate the innovation interaction between domestic firms and 
multinational firms in Zhongguancun. They also find that domestic research institutes (universities 
and research institutions) are increasingly important when compared with foreign firms in promoting 
learning capability and thus innovation of local firms. Liefner et al. (2006) regard both foreign firms 
and domestic research institutes as helping promote the innovation of firms in Zhongguancun and 
argue that firms without the necessary learning capability might not be able to absorb foreign 
technologies. 
 The above literature concentrates on two mechanisms: firm–academia collaboration and FDI 
inflows, which correspond to the two major channels mentioned in China’s official documents on 
developing NTZs as mentioned in Section 2. In addition, they are also in line with the two major 
sources of technological learning (learning by doing domestically and learning by importing foreign 
technologies) as mentioned in the technology catch-up literature (e.g., Kim, 1997; Shen, 1999; Fu et 
al., 2011). As for learning by doing domestically, different articles use different words to express 
similar meaning, such as independent approach (Kim, 1997), indigenous technological development 
(Shen, 1999), indigenous innovation (Fu et al., 2011). Learning by doing here includes not merely 
the learning by producing or investing as mentioned in Arrow (1962), but developing or utilizing all 
kinds of domestic technological knowledge. When it comes to learning by importing foreign 
technologies, the statements also differ, such as learning by importing (Kim, 1997), foreign 
technology transfer (Shen, 1999), absorption of foreign technology (Fu et al., 2011). Therefore, we 
explore the mechanisms from two aspects: learning by doing domestically and learning by importing 
technologies. 
 We utilize the number of co-applied patents by firms and research institutes as a proxy for 
learning by doing domestically. Research institutes provide domestic technological knowledge for 
firms. There are two ways in which firms and research institutes that cooperate can be categorized. 
The first is formal cooperation, which includes, among other things, co-applied patents, joint research 
and development projects, joint establishment of research institutions, transfer of patents to firms 
from research institutes, and joint ventures. The second is informal cooperation, including talent 
network, knowledge exchange, and knowledge sharing, among other things. Co-applied patents are a 
kind of relatively direct and deep cooperation that indicates not only the patent itself but also the wide 
cooperation between firms and research institutes. We employ FDI as a proxy for learning by 
importing technologies, which includes importing hard technologies such as capital goods and soft 
technologies such as talents. 
 Based on the above two streams of literature (on NTZ case studies and on technology catch-up), 
two interaction items are added to the basic regression model: the interaction item between co-applied 
patents and DID (FRU*DID) and that between FDI and DID (FDI*DID). In fact, the incorporation 
of the two interaction items is also in line with the original intention of Chinese central government 
in establishing NTZs: taking advantage of FDI and domestic technological knowledge to promote 
innovation. 
 The result for the whole period is shown in Column 2 of Table 10. Both interaction items are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that both the research institutes and FDI serve 
as important mechanisms of the effect of NTZs on firm innovation.  
 To identify the evolution of the two mechanisms, we compare the results pre- and post-financial 
crisis. The results are shown in Columns 3–4 of Table 10. Before the financial crisis (1995–2008), 
both interaction items were positive and significant, meaning that both the research institutes and FDI 
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served as the important mechanisms. However, the situation after the financial crisis (2009–2013) 
was a little bit different. The coefficient of FRU*DID is significant and positive, but that of FDI*DID 
is insignificant. This means that research institutes still serve as an important mechanism; however, 
FDI does not significantly impact the innovation effect of NTZs, which might be attributed to the 
sharp decline of FDI growth after the financial crisis. This might also indicate that China is relying 
more on learning by doing domestically. Kim (1997) asserts that learning by doing domestically 
becomes more important than learning by importing technologies when a country moves from the 
stage of imitative innovation to that of indigenous innovation. Therefore, our empirical results might 
also indicate that China is experiencing a great transition from imitative innovation to indigenous 
innovation. 
 We then analyze the coefficient of DID. In Column 2, the coefficient of DID is negative but is 
much smaller compared with that in Table 5. This indicates that without the two factors (research 
institutes and FDI), the establishment of NTZs would a negative but mild impact on firm innovation, 
which further indicates the importance of the two mechanisms. Now we analyze the two periods 
separately. Before the financial crisis (Column 3), the coefficient of DID is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, meaning that even without the two factors, there still would be, in all likelihood, other 
factors promoting the innovation effect of the establishment of NTZs. After the financial crisis 
(Column 4), the coefficient of DID is positive but only significant at the 10% level, which means that 
without the two factors, the establishment of NTZs would have no significant or weak impact on firm 
innovation. Both coefficients of DID are smaller compared with those in Table 6. 
 
  Table 10 Two Mechanisms of the Innovation Effect of NTZs 
 1995-2013 1995-2008 2009-2013 
DID -0.2008** 0.9727*** 0.1712*  
(0.0857) (0.1451) (0.1013) 
DID*FRU 80.7641*** 173.8567*** 50.4120*** 
 (2.9154) (5.1127) (2.3841) 
DID*FDI 0.7224*** 0.7297*** 0.0094 
 (0.0393) (0.0839) (0.0437) 
Scale 1.3520*** 1.8416*** 0.2004**  
(0.0599) (0.0553) (0.0904) 
Export 0.4215*** 0.1789*** 0.2136***  
(0.0127) (0.0105) (0.0252) 
Kintensity 1.2321*** 0.5772*** 0.5434***  
(0.0315) (0.0302) (0.0486) 
Age -1.0324*** -0.4831*** 0.1669  
(0.0596) (0.0451) (0.1447) 
Subordination -0.0038 0.0031 -0.0149***  
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0056) 
Ownership -0.0746* -0.0499 0.2422**  
(0.0395) (0.0305) (0.1038) 
R square 0.0383 0.0238 0.0121 
Obs 4701365 3019015 1682350 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Patent quality is measured by five-year forward citations *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 Is China’s innovation boom a miracle or mirage? The issue has attracted widespread attention 
around the world but remains to be answered in a strict and normative way. First, existing patent 
growth hypotheses focuses on one dimension (a certain institution or policy), and thus fail to illustrate 
many important parts of innovation development in China. Second, previous related studies consider 
only patent quantity without incorporating patent quality, making it difficult to accurately measure 
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innovation. We solve the two challenges in the existing literature by focusing on the establishment of 
NTZs, which includes a range of institutions and policies, and identifying the quality of patents with 
our unique Chinese Patent Census Database. In doing so, we can systematically answer the above 
question. 
 Our empirical results show that China, in general, is creating an innovation miracle. The 
establishment of NTZs has promoted the overall level of innovation, the innovation of high-tech 
industries, and indigenous innovation measured by both the quantity and quality of invention patents. 
This conclusion has passed a series of robustness tests. Apart from this, the dynamic analysis shows 
that the effect of the establishment of NTZs on innovation is instantaneous and has strengthened over 
time. 
 However, there are two types of innovation mirages as well. The first is the mirage of patent 
quality after the financial crisis. The establishment of NTZs has no significant impact on patent 
quality after the financial crisis, which might be attributed to the relatively radical macro planning 
from then on. The second is the mirage of innovation structure; that is to say, the balanced 
development of China’s innovation structure has deteriorated. The establishment of NTZs has brought 
patent quality enhancement for SOEs but not for non-SOEs (particularly FOEs), which might be 
ascribed to the imperfect market institution. 
 All in all, we have provided strong evidence that China in general is creating an innovation 
miracle with its national innovation development strategy. Though more studies are still needed in 
terms of the NTZ strategy package (institutions, policies, macro planning) in order to investigate the 
reasons behind the innovation miracle and innovation mirage in China, We are able to draw some 
broad policy suggestions on the basis of our analysis. First, innovation development is the result of 
the joint action of market (institutions) and government (policies, macro planning). The absence of 
either side would fail to explain the innovation boom in China. Second, a well-designed macro 
planning should consider not only patent quantity but also patent quality. Third, the market reform 
should keep pace with the evolution of innovation, or it would become a hindrance, and might lead 
to the mirage of innovation structure. 
 One thing to note is that the conclusions of our empirical results should be interpreted with 
caution when being generalized. First, there are some innovations that do not take the form of patents, 
but patents are a relatively better innovation indicator. Second, since non-above-scale industrial firms 
and firms in service sectors are not included in the Chinese Industrial Firm Census Database available, 
we are not able to investigate innovation of these firms. Patent applications by above-scale industrial 
firms account for 44.07% of the total patent applications by domestic firms and 83.88% of industrial 
firm patents; thus, our sample is relatively representative. Third, NTZs might not be able to tell the 
whole story of the national innovation development strategy although it is multidimensional and 
comprehensive when compared with patent subsidy policy, patent system reform, technology transfer 
policy, etc. Fourth, the cost of innovation development in China should also be considered when 





Appendix I: Figures Mentioned in Section 1 and Section 2 
 
 
Figure A1 Number of Patent Disclosures by Applicant Type (1991-2018) 
Note: To avoid the time-lag error between patent application and patent disclosure, we use the number of annual patent disclosures rather than that of annual 
patent applications. Research Institutes include scientific research institutions and universities. 
Source: Author calculations based on Chinese Patent Census Database.  
 
Figure A2 Number of NTZs Annually Established in China (1984–2018) 































































Figure A3 Provincial Distribution of the Number of Total NTZs in mainland China  
 Source: Author calculations based on data from the China Development Zone Audit Announcement Catalogue (2018 Edition). 
 
 
Figure A4 The ratio of patent grants from two resources: Chinese Patent Census Database and 



















































































































Figure A5 Provincial Distribution of Invention Ratio in 2017 (%) in mainland China 
 Note: Invention Ratio refers to the ratio of invention applications in certain provinces to those in mainland China. 










































Appendix II: Comparisons among Innovation Indicators 
 We explain here why a patent is an excellent indicator of technological innovation. Commonly 
used innovation indicators include R&D, patents, productivity, and the value of new products. The 
roles of these four types of innovation indicators can be illustrated with the input and output of 
technological knowledge as shown in Figure A6.  
 R&D is only one of the several input factors that are needed for the acquisition of technical 
knowledge. There are at least three drawbacks in measuring technological innovation with R&D. 
First, R&D is only an input of technological knowledge and does not necessarily result in outputs. 
Hu and Jefferson (2009) show that the correlation between the number of patents and R&D 
investment is very low. Second, R&D outsourcing has become an important way to make forays in 
innovation competition for many firms (Chesbrough, 2003), indicating that innovation does not 
necessarily require intramural R&D investment. Third, the problem of missing data is very serious 
for R&D investment (Koh and Reeb, 2015). Because the disclosure of R&D information is not 
mandatory, many enterprises choose not to disclose it.  
 Productivity and new products may (or may not) be the outputs of technical knowledge. Some 
productivity growth and new product benefits do not emanate from technological knowledge but 
rather from management innovation and innovation spirit (Nagaoka et al., 2010). Nonetheless, 
technological innovation is the major contributor to economic growth, particularly in the long run 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), although management 
innovation and innovation spirit are also important contributors.  
 In addition, there are two important drawbacks in relation to productivity indicators. First, there 
are various methods being used to calculate productivity, which might produce completely different 
results. Second, firm-level deflators are always unavailable, which makes the calculation of real 
inputs and outputs inaccurate. Furthermore, there are also two obvious deficiencies of new products. 
First, the definition of what constitutes a new product is subjective, and it is, to a large extent, up to 
firm owners. Second, new products can only reflect product innovation but not process innovation. 
 In contrast, patents are carriers of technical knowledge, and thus, they are at the core of 
technological innovation. In the knowledge production function, patents are outputs, while R&D is 
input. In the production function, patents serve as inputs to create final outputs, which, in turn, would 
lead to an increase in R&D investment as reflected in the R&D production function. R&D, patents, 
and final outputs form simultaneous equations regarding technological innovation, in which patents 
play a central role. 
 In fact, the simultaneous equations are originally from CDM model, which was first put forward 
by the seminal work of Crépon et al. (1998). Crépon et al. (1998) studied the impact of R&D on 
innovation and the effect of innovation on productivity. However, they neglect the impact of 
productivity on R&D. Many scholars (e.g., Janz et al.，2003；Lööf and Heshmati，2006; Jefferson 
et al., 2006) have incorporated the impact of productivity on R&D into the CDM model. Based on 
Chinese firm-level manufacturing data, Jefferson et al. (2006) studied the R&D production function, 
knowledge production function, and production function with a recursive three-equation system. Lööf 












Figure A6 Input and Output of Technological Knowledge 
R& D 
Patent Output (new products,  productivity) 
Other inputs 
Knowledge Production Function Production Function 
R& D Production Function 
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Appendix III: Robustness Analysis 
 
(i) Other Patent Quality Indicators 
 Although 5-year forward citations accounts for most citations by the end of 2018, they still cannot 
represent all forward citations. To avoid the influence of arbitrary selection of years, we also estimate 
with one-year forward citations.  
 The results shown in Table A1 are basically consistent with those in the basic regression (Table 
4 and Table 5). The only exception is that the DID coefficients for granted patents in the equations of 
average patent quality are insignificant before adding control variables; however, they are moderately 
significant after adding the control variables. This might be the result of insufficient forward citations 
within 1 year, which further indicates the necessity of using 5-year forward citations. The proportion 
of patents citations within 1 year to those by the end of 2018 is only 17.82%. 
Table A1 The Impact of the Establishment of NTZs on Patent Quality (One-year Forward Citations) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Average Patent Quality Innovation 
Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
Panel A：Without Controls 
DID 0.0587*** 0.0227 0.0582*** 1.1025*** 0.3932*** 0.9081*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0141) (0.0115) (0.0717) (0.0546) (0.0531) 
R square 0.0070 0.0050 0.0039 0.0260 0.0179 0.0160 
Obs 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 
Panel B：With Controls 
DID 0.0629*** 0.0255* 0.0623*** 1.1299*** 0.4089*** 0.9280*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0726) (0.0554) (0.0540) 
Scale 0.0930*** 0.0664*** 0.0395*** 0.7120*** 0.3972*** 0.3659*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0097) (0.0083) (0.0485) (0.0390) (0.0344) 
Export 0.0438*** 0.0356*** 0.0262*** 0.3419*** 0.2389*** 0.1938*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0100) (0.0079) (0.0072) 
Kintensity 0.1361*** 0.1081*** 0.0774*** 0.9516*** 0.6350*** 0.5371*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0043) (0.0248) (0.0190) (0.0179) 
Age -0.1234*** -0.1038*** -0.0702*** -0.9108*** -0.6369*** -0.5374*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0068) (0.0470) (0.0367) (0.0324) 
Subordination -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0035* -0.0020 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0016) 
Ownership -0.0092 -0.0152*** 0.0001 -0.0655** -0.0760*** -0.0219 
 (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0046) (0.0301) (0.0237) (0.0204) 
R square 0.0076 0.0055 0.0043 0.0289 0.0201 0.0176 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
 Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Patent quality is measured by one-year forward citations *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A includes regressions without control variables. Panel B includes regressions with all 
the six control variables mentioned above. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). 
 Besides forward citations, there are some other indicators that can be used to measure patent 
quality, such as the number of claims. More claims indicate a wider scope of patent protection and 
thus higher patent quality (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam, 1998; Bessen, 
2008). 
 The Chinese Patent Census Database used in previous studies include not the variable of the 
number of claims.10 The results are shown in Table A2, which, again, are basically consistent with 
those in the basic regression. 
 In brief, regardless of which index of patent quality is used, the establishment of NTZs has 
significantly promoted firm innovation. 
                                                             
10 The only exceptions are Dang and Motohashi (2015), who use the number of nouns in the claims document as a proxy for the 




Table A2    The Impact of the Establishment of NTZs on Patent Quality (Number of claims) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Average Patent Quality Innovation 
Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
Panel A：Without Controls 
DID 1.0345*** 0.5072*** 0.9321*** 1.9491*** 0.7769*** 1.6509*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0586) (0.0579) (0.1190) (0.0934) (0.0929) 
R square 0.0219 0.0153 0.0146 0.0267 0.0183 0.0169 
Obs 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 4859810 
Panel B：With Controls 
DID 1.0483*** 0.5163*** 0.9459*** 1.9857*** 0.7985*** 1.6791*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0595) (0.0589) (0.1205) (0.0947) (0.0944) 
Scale 1.0423*** 0.6792*** 0.6302*** 1.4634*** 0.8645*** 0.8179*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0386) (0.0369) (0.0785) (0.0642) (0.0589) 
Export 0.3557*** 0.2718*** 0.2473*** 0.6074*** 0.4343*** 0.3755*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0164) (0.0133) (0.0124) 
Kintensity 0.9673*** 0.7027*** 0.6752*** 1.6515*** 1.1218*** 1.0198*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0410) (0.0321) (0.0312) 
Age -0.7764*** -0.6246*** -0.5655*** -
1.4804*** 
-1.0708*** -0.9520*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0374) (0.0345) (0.0768) (0.0613) (0.0557) 
Subordination 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0027 
 (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0028) 
Ownership -0.0783*** -0.0893*** -0.0416* -0.1288** -0.1404*** -0.0606* 
 (0.0295) (0.0249) (0.0232) (0.0500) (0.0401) (0.0360) 
R square 0.0242 0.0171 0.0162 0.0296 0.0205 0.0187 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Patent quality is measured by the number of claims *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A includes regressions without control variables. Panel B includes regressions with all the 
six control variables mentioned above. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). 
(ii) Considering the Number and Area of NTZs 
 In the basic regression, the number and area of NTZs are not taken into account. However, it is 
likely that NTZs numbering more than one are being established in one municipality in a given year. 
Besides, different NTZs differ in area. Both the number and the area of NTZs are likely to have 
important impacts on innovation. However, previous studies (e.g., Wang, 2013; Alder et al., 2013) 
neglect the two important factors. We incorporate the two factors by resetting the DID variable with 
similar ways as the original one. Owing to space limitations, we only list the results with innovation 
as dependent variable and with control variables. 
 The results are shown in Table A3. After considering the number and area of development zones, 
the DID coefficients corresponding to innovation were still significantly positive for all types of 
patents. The sign and significance of the regression coefficients of the control variables are basically 
the same as those shown in Tables 3 and 4 but are not listed here because of space limitations. These 
results provide further evidence of the robustness of the initial results.  




Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
DID 1.0762*** 0.4550*** 0.8605*** 0.4839*** 0.2706*** 0.3263*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0497) (0.0506) (0.0437) (0.0351) (0.0316) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0232 0.0157 0.0144 0.0230 0.0157 0.0141 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. The dependent variable is innovation. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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(iii) Considering Either National Econ-Tech Zones or National High-Tech Zones 
 In the basic regression, National Econ-Tech Zones and National High-Tech Zones are 
incorporated simultaneously. However, as mentioned above, there is still a little bit of difference 
between the two types of NTZ. Hence, we now analyze the effects of the two types of NTZ on 
innovation separately. Owing to space limitations, we only list the results with innovation as 
dependent variable and with control variables. 
 As can be seen from Table A4, all the DID coefficients are significantly positive, which further 
justifies the necessity of considering the two types of NTZs simultaneously. 
Table A4 Innovation Effects of Either National Econ-Tech Zones or National High-Tech Zones 
Dependent 
Variable 
National Econ-Tech Zones National High-Tech Zones 
Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted Patent Patent Granted Patent Ungranted 
DID 1.5171*** 0.6154*** 1.2361*** 1.0992*** 0.3996*** 0.8614*** 
 (0.0950) (0.0730) (0.0719) (0.1508) (0.1182) (0.1105) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0231 0.0157 0.0144 0.0229 0.0156 0.0141 
Obs 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. The dependent variable is innovation. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
(iv) Firm Mobility among Municipalities 
 There are two effects when neighboring municipalities establish NTZs. The first is negative 
beggar-thy-neighbor effects, which means that the establishment of NTZs in neighboring 
municipalities leads to the outflow of resources in a specific municipality. The second consists of 
positive spillover effects; that is to say, NTZs in neighboring municipalities produce positive 
externalities to the given municipality. Alder et al. (2013) find that the establishment of special 
economic zones did not result in beggar-thy-neighbor effects, but instead, they resulted in spillover 
effects. 
 Following the establishment of the NTZs, the innovation growth might be from the inflow of 
firms with innovation activities in neighboring municipalities rather than from local firms. 
Considering the local segmentation among provinces, firm mobility within a province would be easier 
than that across provinces. Besides, we have included both the firm fixed effect and the province 
dummy variable, which, to a certain extent, controls the impact of firm mobility among provinces. 
Therefore, we define two neighboring municipalities not on the basis of geographical distance but on 
whether they are in the same province.  
 To control for the impact of firm mobility among municipalities, we set a new variable “Neighbor.” 
Assume that there were established NTZs in municipality A in year t. If there are also NTZs in 
neighboring municipalities in or after the year t, then we set “neighbor” at 1 for municipality A in or 
after the year (no earlier than t) when NTZs are granted in neighboring municipalities, and 0 otherwise.  
 The results are shown in Table A5. Columns 2–4 show the results without control variables and 
Columns 5–7 give the results with control variables. The coefficients of Neighbor are insignificant, 
which indicates that the positive spillover effects and negative beggar-thy-neighbor effects almost 
cancel each other out. The DID coefficients are all significantly positive, indicating that even after 
considering the cross-regional flow of enterprises, the establishment of NTZs still significantly 
promotes innovation.  











DID 1.2400*** 0.5022*** 1.0206*** 1.2686*** 0.5233*** 1.0375*** 
 (0.1101) (0.0859) (0.0828) (0.1110) (0.0868) (0.0838) 
Neighbour -0.1415 -0.1399 -0.1729 -0.1369 -0.1465 -0.1604 
(0.1546) (0.1223) (0.1157) (0.1569) (0.1243) (0.1178) 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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R square 0.0206 0.0138 0.0128 0.0231 0.0156 0.0143 
Obs 4859810 4859810 4859810 4701365 4701365 4701365 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. The dependent variable is innovation. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
(v) Endogeneity Issues 
 Endogeneity problems arise from two main sources: missing variables and mutual causality. As 
for the problem of missing variables, we use two-way fixed effects and commonly used control 
variables to alleviate it. The problem of mutual causality will be explained in detail below. 
 To verify whether municipalities with more innovation are given priority to establish NTZs, we 
rank municipalities on the basis of innovation in each year and calculate the average rank of 
municipalities in the 2 years right before they are granted the first NTZ. Considering the minor 
changes in the number of municipalities, we calculate the ratio of the rank of each municipality to the 
total number of municipalities. 
 Figure A7 shows that before 2005, most scatters are on the left-hand side, which means that 
municipalities with more innovation are more easily granted NTZs, and thus, there exist certain 
endogeneity problems. However, after that, the distribution seems to be uniform. There are many 
municipalities that have few innovations but are authorized NTZs. This might be related to a regional 
development strategy aimed at narrowing gaps among regions. 
 
Figure A7 Innovation Rank of Municipalities in the Two Years Right before They Are Granted NTZs 
   Source: Our matching data. 
 Figure A7 reveals the possible endogeneity problems, particularly before 2005. The staggered 
DID method used in this study can, to a large extent, control for endogeneity problems. In addition, 
macro-level innovation is likely to have an impact on the authorization of NTZs. However, our 
dependent variable is firm-level innovation, which might have a less direct relationship with the 
authorization of NTZs. 
 Of course, it is also possible that both the authorization of NTZs and firm-level innovation are 
affected by some common factors, such as innovation culture, which might lead to the overestimation 
of the effects of an NTZ grant.  
 For the sake of robustness, we further use the instrumental variable (IV) method to alleviate the 
endogeneity problems. The connections of local officials in the central government (hereinafter 





















China, the establishment of National Econ-Tech Zones and National High-Tech Zones is examined 
by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology, respectively, and then 
approved by the State Council. Hence, local officials with central connections are more likely to make 
their application of NTZs approved. 
 We use the data collected by Jiang (2018), including 62,742 resumes of principal officials at and 
above municipality level from 1995 to 2015. The principal officials include the Party secretary and 
mayor of the municipality (2000–2015), the standing committee of the municipality (2000–2012), the 
provincial Party secretary and governor (1995–2015), and the central committee members (1997–
2015).  
 The variable central connection is calculated through the following three steps. First, as to the 
current officials of each municipality, we identify their past positions in the central government and 
assign values to the positions based on their administrative levels. There are 10 administrative levels: 
“no level” (0); “less than vice country” (10); “vice country” (20); “country” (30); “vice municipality” 
(40); “municipality” (50); “vice province” (60); “province” (70); “vice state” (80); and “state” (90). 
The figures in parentheses are the values that we assigned to the various administrative levels.  
 Second, in addition to considering the administrative level, we also need to consider whether the 
administrative department directly or indirectly affects the establishment of NTZs. As mentioned 
above, the NTZs are mainly examined by either the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Science 
and Technology, and then, they are approved by the State Council. Thus, we divided the departments 
into four categories: other departments (0); science and technology-related departments (1); the 
Ministry of Science and Technology or the Ministry of Commerce (2); and the Communist Party (at 
the central level), the State Council, and the Central Military Commission (3). The figures in 
parentheses signify the different department levels. Because the administrative level might have more 
influence on the establishment of NTZs when compared with department level, we assign two digits 
to the administrative levels and one digit to the department levels.  
 Third, we add up the value of the administrative level and that of the department level to obtain 
the value of central connections of each position. Then, we can take the maximum value of central 
connections for each official, on the basis of which we are able to further calculate the maximum 
value of central connections for each municipality. 
 The results are shown in Table A6. Before using the IV method, we must test whether the key 
explanatory variable is endogenous.  
 Because the traditional Hausman test applies only to the situation of homoskedasticity, we use 
the heteroskedasticity-robust DWH (Durbin-Wu-Hausman) test. The results show that the DWH tests 
are all highly significant and thus strongly reject the null hypothesis of the exogenous DID variable.  
 The coefficients of IV are significantly positive, which confirms the relevance between IV and 
the DID variable. In other words, stronger central connections benefit the establishment of NTZs.  
 We now further test the validity of IV. The identification test shows that the Kleibergen–Paap rk 
LM statistics are 81,000 and 75,000 in the equations with and without control variables, respectively, 
and are all significant at the 1% level, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the IV is 
unidentified. Then, we conduct weak IV test with Cragg–Donald Wald F statistics, which assume the 
disturbance items to be independent and identically distributed, and the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM 
statistics without the above assumption. In the equations without control variables, the two statistics 
are 100,000 and 85,000, respectively. After including the control variables, they are 93,000 and 
78,000, respectively. Both are much larger than the critical value of 16.38 at the 10% significance 
level and thus strongly reject the null hypothesis of a weak IV. Because we only use one IV, there 
exists no over-identification problem. 
 As for the exogeneity of IV, there is no direct relationship between the central connections and 
firm innovation, and the IV is likely to be exogenous. 
 The DID coefficients in the IV regression are larger than those in the basic regression (Table 5), 
which might result from the local average treatment effect. Jiang (2017) investigates 255 journal 
articles using IV, and finds that on average, the results with IV are about nine times those without IV 
30 
 
even if most of the results without IV are overestimated,11 and attributes it to the local average 
treatment effect.  
 The central connections might also lead to the problem of local average treatment effect. We 
assume that there are four types of municipalities. The first municipality would actively apply for 
NTZs regardless of whether there are central connections. The second municipality would not apply 
for NTZs regardless of whether there are central connections. The third municipality would actively 
apply for NTZs if and only if there are central connections. The fourth municipality would actively 
apply for NTZs when there are no central connections but would not apply for NTZs when there are 
central connections. IV regression reflects only the third and fourth municipalities,12 and thus, it is a 
kind of local average treatment effect, which might be larger than the results considering all the four 
municipalities. 
 Although the coefficients of the DID variable in the IV regression might be overestimated, they 
are significantly positive, which further verifies the robustness of the finding that the establishment 
of NTZs has promoted innovation.  
 To avoid the possible impact caused by the value of administrative levels and departmental levels, 
we assigned one digit to both the value of administrative levels and that of departmental levels. We 
also change the calculation operator from addition (summation) to multiplication with regard to the 
relationship between the two levels and consider only the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology when calculating departmental levels. Regardless of how we set the value of 
IV, the results are robust.  











DID 9.8596*** 7.2841*** 5.3738*** 7.9172*** 5.7975*** 4.3625*** 
 (0.2292) (0.1804) (0.1598) (0.2371) (0.1866) (0.1661) 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0118 0.0042 0.0102 0.0352 0.0250 0.0239 




** 536.1410*** 571.2220*** 603.4190*** 
287.7240**
* 
IV 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. The dependent variable is innovation. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
(vi) New Control Group 
 There are 63 municipalities that have been authorized NTZs before 1995, which might be 
different from those that have not been authorized NTZs when being used as the control group. 
Therefore, we drop the sample in the municipalities authorized NTZs before 1995, to obtain a new 
control group and redo the regressions as in Table 4 and Table 5. The results are still robust (see Table 
A7). 
  Most municipalities that had been authorized NTZs before 1995 are developed municipalities, 
including the four province-level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), and 
other coastal municipalities. If we drop these municipalities, the endogeneity problem would be even 
more serious as shown in Figure A7. Therefore, we retain this sample in our basic regressions. As 
shown in Figure 2, the effect of the establishment of NTZs has strengthened over time. Hence, 
retaining this sample would only underestimate, rather than overestimate, the positive effect of the 
establishment of NTZs on innovation. 
 
                                                             
11 Card (2001) comes to similar conclusions after analyzing a host of journal articles on labor economics.  
12 In fact, the situation of the fourth municipality is relatively rare and can be ignored. Therefore, the results of the IV regression 
only reflect the situation in the third municipality. 
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Panel A: Patent Quantity 
DID 0.9017*** 0.4312*** 0.6080*** 0.9635*** 0.4677*** 0.6439*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0564) (0.0522) (0.0776) (0.0581) (0.0537) 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0188 0.0124 0.0114 0.0211 0.0141 0.0128 
Obs 2381040 2381040 2381040 2293074 2293074 2293074 
Panel B: Average Patent Quality 
DID 0.2572*** 0.1639*** 0.1934*** 0.2851*** 0.1855*** 0.2090*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0469) (0.0369) (0.0537) (0.0484) (0.0379) 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0064 0.0046 0.0037 0.0074 0.0054 0.0042 
Obs 2381040 2381040 2381040 2293074 2293074 2293074 
Panel C: Innovation 
DID 1.1133*** 0.5647*** 0.7565*** 1.1975*** 0.6178*** 0.8047*** 
 (0.1083) (0.0864) (0.0734) (0.1111) (0.0888) (0.0754) 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
R square 0.0147 0.0094 0.0091 0.0167 0.0108 0.0102 
Obs 2381040 2381040 2381040 2293074 2293074 2293074 
Note: Patent here refers to invention only. Innovation = Patent Quantity × (Average Patent Quality+1). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
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